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THE RIGHT TO FOOD BETWEEN THE JUSTICIABILITY  
AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE
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Abstract: Basic food must be guaranteed by States as a fundamental right of all people. In this article we 
defend the hypothesis that the path of justiciability is insufficient to achieve full recognition of the right to 
food as a fundamental social right. A strong and active public sphere is needed to address the obstacles to 
this recognition today. Some of them are actually related to the inherited legal culture. And, on the other 
hand, that promotes the creation of new institutions to guarantee social rights. The constitutional State 
needs a “fourth estate” that guarantees fundamental rights and protects the common good from private 
powers.
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recognItIon of the rIght to food a) The neoliberal thought b) The legacy legal culture d) Subjective rights 
of the individual and the affected e) Rights and justiciability: an inadequate defence strategy 3. a publIc 
sphere that promotes and protects the rIght to food a) A weak political community, which lacks public 
participation and does not safeguard the common good 4. a publIc sphere wIch Influences the role of 
the constItutIonal state: the need for a “fourth power”.
1. food as a “fundamental good”
In the debate on the constitutional state, the Italian jurist Luigi Ferrajoli defends the 
introduction in the legal lexicon of a new category of goods: the “fundamentals” (Ferrajoli 
2014, 207; 2019). This new legal category would be composed of all those goods that are 
vital, indispensable, for life, such as water, air, lifesaving drugs, the oceans, the organs 
that make up the body human, and the basics foods. Ferrajoli proposes to divide them 
in three subgroups: a) common goods, the old res communes omnium, such as water, air 
and the environment, access to and the use of which is vital for all people and which 
therefore are the subject of fundamental law concerning freedom of use or enjoyment; b) 
non-transferable personal goods, such as the parts of the human body, that are the subject 
of fundamental rights of bodily integrity: freedom from lesions or violation; and c) social 
goods, such as life-saving or “essential” drugs or basic food and water, and as such the 
subject of fundamental social rights to health and subsistence (Ferrajoli 2011, 733-734; 
2014, 213-214).
1 Associate Professor SH, University of Barcelona, Spain (hsilveira@ub.edu).
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In the guaranteest constitutional state model that Ferrajoli proposes, these goods 
come under the protection of the so-called “sphere of the undecidable”2. As indispensable 
goods for human life, they must be placed outside the realm of action of the powers, 
publics and privates (Ferrajoli 2014, 213).
The right to food is recognised in international law as a human right, in the sense 
that everyone should be able to have “physical and economic access at all times to adequate 
food or means for its procurement” (CESCR GC12). In the words of Olivier de Schutter, 
the right to food is:
“the right to have regular, permanent and unrestricted access, either directly 
or by means of financial purchases, to quantitatively and qualitatively 
adequate and sufficient food corresponding to the cultural traditions of the 
people to which the consumer belongs, and which ensure a physical and 
mental, individual and collective, fulfilling and dignified life free of fear”3
This requires ensuring that all people can feed themselves with food that is available—and 
therefore that there is sufficient produce for the whole of the population—accessible—so, 
every household must have sufficient means to obtain or produce the food they require—
and in addition, adequate, in the sense that the food must be suitable to satisfy the needs 
of each person, taking into account their age, living conditions, health, occupation, sex, 
culture, etc.
The right to food is a transversal right without which it is impossible to understand 
the concepts of person and of citizen. The human condition depends on every person 
having available to them and being able to access basic sustenance. Only once this access 
to food is guaranteed can we talk of the possibility of exercising full citizenship (Rodotà 
2012, 130). This right cannot be understood unless other principles and rights provided 
under a constitutional state are also respected such as, for example: respect for the dignity 
of the person and cultural diversity, the principle of not discriminating unfairly, the right 
to free personal development, autonomy, integrity and the inviolability of the person, and 
the principles of cooperation and decency.
2. guaranteeIng tHe rIgHt to food
The obligations of the states that are party to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to guarantee the right to adequate food 
are clearly defined in international law. These obligations are both general and specific4. 
General obligations, such as guaranteeing the right to food and water, are exercised 
2 This sphere is in turn subdivided into two others: the “sphere of the undecidable that is”, consisting of the 
rights to freedom and autonomy, which cannot be modified; and the “sphere of the undecidable that is not”, 
formed by the set of social rights and which, in contrast to the former, must obligatorily be guaranteed and 
fulfilled by public authorities (Ferrajoli 2014, 54).
3 De Schutter, Olivier (Un Special Rapporteur 2008-2014), (15-10-2020), http://www.srfood.org/es/derecho-
a-la-alimentacion
4 On this issue, see Golay (2009).
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without discrimination, equally for all men and women, and require states to adopt 
measures by all means necessary to realise the right to food such as, for example, through 
legislation or acting in order to bring about the full effectiveness of the the right to food, 
making maximum use of the resources available (Arts. 2, 3 ICESCR). “Violations of 
the Covenant occur when a State fails to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, the 
minimum essential level required to be free from hunger.” (CESCR, General Observation 
12, paragraph 17).
Meanwhile, the specific obligations consist of respecting, protecting and ensuring 
observance of the right to food. Respecting, in the sense that public authorities must not 
arbitrarily deprive people of the the right to food, or hinder access to food5. Protecting 
requires states to regulate companies, social organisations or people who may threaten 
the right of others to adequate food and water6. Finally, ensuring observance of the the 
right to food, requires states to mobilise all their available resources to guarantee in a 
progressive fashion the full realisability of this right, particularly through drawing up 
new legislation. Specifically, the obligations that apply to states must initially be enacted 
through the adoption of measures that allow people to feed themselves via their own 
means. This requires providing the necessary facilities for people to enjoy the right to 
food. In second place, the states themselves must fulfil the right to food of all those who 
cannot feed themselves—children, the unemployed, the aged, etc.—whether through the 
distribution of food or implementation of social aid programmes7.
In international law the right to food has seen important advances in terms of 
specification, to the point where secondary instruments of guarantee have been created. 
For example, the Optional Protocol of the ICESCR, approved in 2008 and in force since 
5th May 2013, opens the way for people to report infractions of their economic, social and 
cultural rights. States must therefore guarantee that all individuals can feed themselves. 
To this end, basic food must be available, accessible and adequate. Despite its recognition 
in international law, the main challenge for the right to food is to ensure that States also 
recognize it as a fundamental social right. But there are a number of obstacles against this.
3. oBstacles to tHe recognItIon of tHe rIgHt to food
a) The neoliberal thought
The hegemony of neoliberalism in the governing institutions of Western countries 
in recent decades has become a checkpoint for the recognition of the right to food to be 
considered as a fundamental right. This is because for neoliberalism food must be treated 
as a commodity like any other. They should be part of the patrimonial goods, available, 
appropriable and tradeable, just like other goods, until now considered “common goods”, 
5 Comisión, El derecho a la alimentación. Informe del Relator especial, Jean Ziegler, (16 de marzo 2006), 
Doc NUE/CN 4/2006/ 44, párrafo 22.
6 Directrices de Maastricht relativas a las violaciones de los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales, 
párrafo 18.
7 Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, Observación general 12.
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such as water, air, oceans and forests. Likewise, the attempt to make basic foodstuffs the 
object of protection of a new social right clashes with the neoliberal tendency to privatize 
social rights and to reduce to a minimum everything that has to do with the public.
b) The legacy legal culture
Inherited legal culture is another important obstacle when theorizing as fundamental 
rights and freedoms acts and decisions which are the expression of private powers. One of 
the foundations of the legacy legal culture is the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen, written by the French Constituent Assembly in order to tackle the extremely 
stratified society of the period, with its inequalities and feudal privileges. More to the point, 
in relation to the subject we are considering here, is the fact that the Declaration signified 
the triumph of the non-egalitarian liberal sector over the more democratic plebeian-
leaning Jacobin wing in the revolutionary process in France (Silveira 2017a). Through 
the call for “fraternity”, the Jacobins intended to promote a programme of republican 
political economy with the objective of allowing citizens to be genuinely self-sufficient 
and economically independent so that they could, at the same time, be active, free and 
equal citizens. The Jacobins had no concept of a life of freedom without each individual 
necessarily being self-sufficient in terms of their own individual existence8. The Republic, 
as Antonio Domènech writes when he summarises the ideas of Robespierre, “must ensure 
the ‘means of existence’ for all; everyone must have sufficient property for them not to 
need to ask permission of anyone else in order to be able to subsist” (2004, 82).9
The Republican project of fraternity advocated a civil society in which everyone 
had their “right to existence” assured. Democracy was understood as “fraternity”, in the 
sense that it was necessary to achieve a civil society, “that not only incorporated everybody, 
but in which everybody was also fully and reciprocally free, that is, equal in the old 
republican sense of the word” (Domènech 2004, 91-92)10. Therefore, we could say that the 
Jacobin political project already contemplated the right to food and water as a right that 
the community—the Republic—should guarantee, precisely so that the community itself 
could count on the political participation of all citizens11. After the Thermidorian Reaction, 
however, a philosophy which was entirely contrary to this project of fraternal democracy 
took root and a republic of mere owners was established, in which the (unlimited) right 
to property was recognised, together with economic freedom and non-universal census-
based democracy. From that moment, private property was consecrated as a “sacred and 
inviolable right”, of which nobody “can be deprived” (art. XVII of the Declaration).
8 Jefferson, for example, dreamt of a society based on small agricultural properties; Robespierre suggested 
a social right to existence guaranteed by the public authorities; and Paine wanted material income assigned 
unconditionally to all citizens, merely as a result of being such (Domènech 2013, 20).
9 “What is the first goal of society? To uphold the indefeasible rights of man. What is the first of those rights? 
The right to exist. So, the first social law is that which ensures the means to exist for all members of society; 
all the others are subordinate to this: property has only been instituted and guaranteed as the foundation of 
that law” (Translated from Domènech 2004, 82).
10 The anti-Jacobin coup of 9th Thermidor 1794 put an end to this goal of “universal fraternal democracy” 
propounded by the Jacobin Republicans (Domènech 2004, 92).
11 During the period of Jacobin democracy, from 10th August 1792 to 27th July 1794 (9th Termidor 1794), 
the universal right to existence was recognised and full male suffrage was achieved.
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In the bourgeois democracy of ownership another very clear dividing line is 
imposed, a real chasm, between the realm in which the private powers act, governed 
by the principle of free choice, and the sphere in which the public authorities act. In the 
following decades, throughout the 19th century, the liberal legal doctrine saw to it that this 
construct was consolidated, defining civil rights of freedom of choice as personal liberties, 
to be used in the private sphere, both by individual people and legal entities, to strike deals 
and do business (Ferrajoli 2014, 171-172). In this way, however, the doctrine hides or 
diminishes the importance of the “normative effects” that private powers produce in the 
legal sphere of other subjects, affecting the rights, liberties and interests of other people. 
Civil rights, which belong in the private sphere, are one thing and very different from the 
freedoms of people (Ferrajoli 2014, 52-53).
c) Subjective rights of the individual and the affected
In addition to this doctrinal doublespeak, we also have to consider two further 
elements that hinder recognition of fundamental goods within the category of fundamental 
rights. These are: a) the strictly individualist structure of right, they are constructed as 
subjective rights of the individual; b) and the fact that the legal procedures are predicated 
on the idea that it has to be the individual, the subject who is affected, who takes the 
initiative and sets in motion the principle of “cause of action” to defend their own interests 
and rights. But what happens if the goods in question belong to all or, to express it more 
clearly, they do not belong to anyone in particular? Who is going to take responsibility 
if there is no deprivation of a particular right or interest, but rather a deprivation of or 
non-compliance with a vital right or interest which belongs to everyone and on which, 
paradoxically, our other rights and interests depend? Is the legal architecture created 
under the modern rule of law sufficient to safeguard interests that correspond to us all? 
For Ferrajoli, the answer is that “the syntax of fundamental rights attributed to individual 
people as a guarantee of their personal needs and expectations, is not sufficient on its 
own”. In order to achieve effective and complete guardianship of fundamental goods, 
it is necessary to move beyond the legal structure of individual subjective rights and 
broaden the principle of “cause of action” to other actors and institutions in the public 
sphere.
In recent years the right to food is gradually being recognised as a subjective right 
of the individual. In their constitutions, countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, South Africa, 
Nicaragua and Colombia explicitly recognise the right to food and water as an individual 
human right of all people. Other countries explicitly include this right in the recognition of 
the human right to a decent standard of living or the right to personal development, which 
includes necessarily food, such as for example, in Belarus, Moldavia and Malawi. Still 
others recognise it as a governing principle of state policy, such as Nigeria and Sri Lanka; 
or they do so as a consequence of the ratification of international and regional treaties, as 
in the case of Uruguay; or as a consequence of the recognition of this right via by-laws, 
as in the case of the Dominican Republic. Furthermore, international organisations, such 
as the Committee for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), urge states to meet 
the principle of justiciability in relation to those rights enshrined in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
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For its part, the CESCR encourages states to enact laws that allow the justiciability 
of the rights in the Covenant12. For example, it has requested that Colombia ratify the 
Optional Protocol of the ICESCR, meets fully its obligations under the Covenant and 
fosters full recognition and enjoyment of the rights contained therein, in its application 
of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in the national action plan. Similarly, 
it has reiterated to the Dominican Republic, in its fourth report, the need for the state to 
promote the applicability of all the rights enshrined in the Covenant at all levels of the 
legal system. The report says that the Committee has taken note of Article 74 of their 
Constitution but reminds them that the Covenant also ranks as constitutional and is directly 
applicable. It goes on to lament the fact that no information has been provided on cases of 
jurisprudence in which the rights in the Covenant have been invoked or directly applied 
by the national courts13. Likewise, in relation to Uruguay, the CESCR expresses concern 
about the justiciability of the Covenant, despite the fact that in this country the rights in 
the Covenant are directly applicable14.
Enacting and further developing the principle of justiciability is important in order 
to guarantee the right to food and, therefore, the CESCR must urge states to respect and 
abide by this principle. To this end, and also taking into account both the legal limits and 
the legal culture, an important step to guarantee compliance with the right to food on the 
part of both public and private authorities would be its constitutional recognition as an 
individual or fundamental right15. That said, however, the justiciability route to individual 
rights, despite their importance and the central role they play in the functioning of the rule 
of law, has the disadvantage of being a defence strategy and one perceived mainly as the 
recourse of individuals.
d) Rights and justiciability: an inadequate defence strategy
Generally in judicial procedures, the party who brings the legal action is the holder 
of a personal entitlement which has been interfered with. However, the holders of rights 
are not always in the best position to exercise their own fundamental rights; often due to 
not enjoying the economic conditions necessary to do so. Moreover, as a consequence, 
such individuals are in an even worse position when it comes to setting in motion actions 
to demand compliance with rights that protect goods that are not merely their own but 
12 On the relation between the CESCR and some of the signature states, see Silveira et al. (2018).
13 In this way, it recommends that the state adopt the necessary measures to guarantee that all judicial 
decisions pay due respect to human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights, and to amend the 
effects of the sentences TC/0168/13 and TC/0256/14 of the Constitutional Court. The Committee indicates 
that the state should take note of its General Observation (1998) on the internal national application of the 
Covenant (6). Finally, it once again recommends, as in the previous report, that the state ratify the Optional 
Protocol of the Covenant (68).
14 However, these rights are still scarcely visible and the Committee is concerned that certain ambiguities of 
the regulatory framework that affect processes of public interest make it difficult to demand these rights in 
the judicial setting. In this respect, the Committee recommends that the state take the necessary measures 
to guarantee the direct applicability of all the rights in the Covenant and it urges the state to pay attention to 
the Committee’s General Observation no. 9 (1998) on the internal national application of the Covenant (8) 
(final observations, from the fifth report, of 20th July 2017 (E/C.12/URY/CO/5).
15 In this regard, see Medina (2018) and Martín (2016).
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belong to everybody in general and to nobody in particular. This is where it becomes 
clear that, as Ferrajoli writes, the individualist model of rights as presented in the modern 
constitutional states is highly inadequate and insufficient to “ensure observance of the 
bonds imposed on the public sphere by social rights, fundamental goods and collective 
interests stipulated in the Constitution” (2014, 227).
It is true, as Rodotà says us, that rights model and configure democracy. It is also 
true, however, that without a truly democratic policy and without a solid and active public 
sphere, rights can easily fail to be worth the paper they are written on when left in the 
hands of those who have the power to take decisions over the lives of others; such as, for 
example, powers held by the private sphere. That is why, in addition to the call for new 
rights, we also need to demand that the political sphere really attends to the material needs 
of the people. To do so, it must genuinely face up to the private economic powers which, in 
addition to influencing and affecting people’s lives in far-reaching ways, are not required 
to respect and safeguard fundamental rights or the common good, or at least not to the 
same extent as public authorities are obliged to. There should therefore emerge, as Rodotà 
calls for, a new politics that breaks through the armour-plating of the current political 
model and opens up a process of creation of new rights that grow from the grassroots of 
society upwards; and not from the top down, as happens at present (Rodotà 2012, 103-
104). Similarly, for Marramao, the hegemony of the neoliberal social and political project 
must be fought with a normative model of democracy that moves beyond the current 
liberal model, that is, through the construction of a public sphere that is not colonised by 
the institutions of representative democracy (Marramao 2011, 4).
All of this suggests that the defence of fundamental goods cannot be entrusted to 
the guarantee mechanisms constructed to date as part of the current constitutional states. 
Those mechanisms, as I have said, are generally only activated as a result of the actions 
of individuals who are directly affected by an interference with their personal rights. The 
route of justiciability of fundamental rights, and especially of economic, social and cultural 
rights, must necessarily be reinforced and complemented by new instruments of protection 
from within the public sphere16. Respecting and realising the right to food entails, as I have 
also said, guaranteeing access to food and ensuring a fair and just distribution of basic 
food to all the people who need it. But for that to happen, in addition to having available 
to them the legal instruments to claim their rights, the people affected must also have the 
support of a public sphere that takes responsibility for observance of this right. And that 
public sphere must have the powers and means necessary to demand fulfilment of the right 
16 By the public sphere we understand that space in social life where the rights and interests of all are 
at stake, and the consequent duties that we all have with respect to all others (absolute duties or erga 
omnes). This notion of the public sphere has little to do with that used by Habermas to refer to a space for 
public communication, debate and conflicts of opinion. Habermas conceives of the public political sphere 
as an “intermediary system of communication” between, on the one hand, public opinion formed from civil 
society and, on the other, the deliberations and negotiations of the political system (Habermas 2009, 159). 
The public sphere is where public opinion is formed which, at the same time, becomes political force (Fraser 
2008, 146). In contrast, for Ferrajoli, the public sphere exists in opposition to the private sphere, where the 
principle of freedom of choice rules and legal entities make use of their civil rights while having their goods 
at their disposal (Ferrajoli 2011, 758 762).
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to food by both public and private entities. It is the public sphere which, under the rule of 
law, should also establish the limits and obligations to be borne by the private sphere, with 
the goal of protecting the general interest and fundamental rights and, in particular, in order 
to protect the weakest members of society17. In this public sphere a major role is played by 
the three branches of power: legislature, executive and judiciary. What is more, today the 
public sphere is greater than the state sphere and we constantly encounter more multi-state 
institutions and guidelines that intervene in the protection of the common good and human 
rights (the UN, the CESCR, the Human Rights Council, the FAO, the WHO, UNICEF, etc.).
4.  a puBlIc spHere tHat promotes and protects tHe rIgHt to food
The formation of a solid public sphere empowered with the instruments necessary 
to protect fundamental goods and the general interest represents an important challenge 
for current constitutional states. And it is so because here we must also confront another 
of the strong postulates of liberal thought: a weak political community.
a)  A weak political community, which lacks public participation and does 
not safeguard the common good
In liberal political ideology the representative democracy is not necessary to have a 
strong democratic political community and equipped with instruments with which to govern 
and power over the common good (Barcellona 1992, 107). The political institutions were 
designed within a liberal state where the rule of law ensured, in the first place, that public 
participation was not necessary for the functioning of the state and, in the second place, that 
public decisions did not have to impose on the life of the citizens Ovejero n.d. 3)18. The rule 
of law in European countries was built upon the preconceived idea that public institutions 
have to remain neutral when faced with progressive ideas emanating from civil society19.
17 An example of a limit and obligation imposed from the public sphere is Section 51.1 of the Spanish 
Constitution which establishes that “The public authorities shall guarantee the protection of consumers 
and users and shall, by means of effective measures, safeguard their safety, health and legitimate economic 
interests”. In this way: “Free enterprise is recognised within the framework of a market economy” (ibid. 
Section 38) and is limited by respect for the safety and health of consumers. Food safety is established 
together with a limit on the freedom of enterprise, in the sense that private economic initiatives cannot harm 
the dignity, safety, freedom or cultural diversity of the people (Rodotà 2012, 128). 
18 The model of liberal democracy, Crouch writes, is characterised by: a) only being concerned with 
organising participative elections; b) giving considerable freedom to pressure groups so that they can go 
about their activities; and c) prohibiting the public sphere and the political system from interfering in the 
rationale behind the functioning of the economy (Crouch 2004, 35, 146).
19 A current example of the limits of intervention by public authorities when facing the problems of society 
can be found in Art. 34.3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union where it is said that 
“In order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognises and respects the right to social and 
housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources …”. When 
dealing with the issue of poverty and social exclusion, the EU has the audacity to say that it recognises the 
right to social and housing assistance: it only recognises a right to assistance! And that in an unequal society 
where groups of people do not have their basic needs guaranteed and live in poverty.
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This neutrality and lack of commitment on the part of public authorities, which are 
mainly responsible for safeguarding the common good, is reflected in citizens not feeling 
committed to -responsible for- each other and, in consecuense, remaining aloof from 
matters concerning the common good. The only obligations that are recognised are those 
derived from private agreements and pacts. In this way, the line that divides the public and 
the private has ended up also affecting the principle of civic responsibility, which is very 
weak or almost non-existent in the modern constitutional state. Under this type of state, 
citizens can exercise their right to vote but they have no means to supervise the actions of 
public authorities. Moreover, nothing guarantees that the public authorities will always act 
in defence of the common good and of fundamental rights.
Recent years have shown us that, under neoliberal policies, the defence of general 
interests cannot only be left in the hands of the institutions of the state20. Since the birth 
of the constitutional state, the powers of the political sphere have been subordinated 
to the powers of the private sphere, the economic powers, their success at reproducing 
themselves and, in consequence, managing to maintain alive the logic that ensures their 
survival: the logic of profit. The pre-constitutional elements -the right to property and 
the separation of the public sphere from the private- which the bourgeoisie managed to 
impose on the new political power of the constitutional state act, in this respect, as barriers 
to calls for democratisation and for the establishment of limits or meaningful bonds on the 
social powers (Barcellona 1992, 129).
New limits and obligations can be imposed on public authorities, as does indeed 
happen in the constitutional state, but not in relation to the private sphere. In this way, the 
economic powers see their rights and properties protected under the principle of freedom 
of choice and the treatment of civil rights as if they were rights to freedom (Ferrajoli 2014, 
52). Meanwhile, it is one thing to say that the actions of public authorities accord with 
the rule of law and quite another to claim that their actions are always governed by the 
principle of the common good or the defence and prioritising of the general interest. As 
Hilary Wainwright points out, after analysing different experiences of public participation 
in European and Latin American cities, “the state institutions are not the same as the 
common or public good, and neither have they demonstrated that they are capable of 
looking after it” (Wainwright 2005, 195).
20 The rights of different collectives—those with mortgages, the sick, dependents, schoolchildren, retired 
people, the unemployed, workers—are always pushed into the background in the face of the demands of 
an economic system that must maintain the logic that governs the exchange of goods: that of profit. It is 
enough to read through the principles and norms of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(Arts. 26.2, 63, 107 and 106.2) or the Fiscal Compact (Title III of the Fiscal Stability Treaty), approved 
on 2nd March 2012, which contains the principles of stability or budgetary excess, or the latest reform 
of the European constitutions, such as Section 135 of the Spanish Constitution, to see the extent to which 
economic logic rules or is imposed on any other, such as political logic or the logic of rights. Or see the 
Spanish Royal Decree, Law 20/2012, of 13th July, concerning measures to guarantee budgetary stability and 
to foster competitiveness, which establishes cuts in Social Security benefits and in the application of Law 
39/2006 concerning dependency, reducing the maximum amounts of economic benefits for home care; and 
Executive Order ASC/471/2010, of 28th September, which limits the right to home help for certain people 
who lack decision-making capacities, replacing it by care in nursing homes.
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It is true, however, that the constitutions of the post-war era have placed new 
obligations on the state: social rights, some of which appear as fundamental rights, as is 
the case with the right to education in the Spanish legal system. These legal instruments 
are still, however, insufficient to guarantee full compliance with the obligations. Few of 
the social rights have become recognised as individual rights or as fundamental rights. 
New institutions are needed which genuinely guarantee fundamental goods and in addition 
defend what is common to all people who live together in a community.
Thus, in order to achieve effective protection of fundamental rights, the public 
sphere must have at its disposal new instruments that strengthen the principle of “cause 
of action” when such rights are violated. Under the current constitutional state and 
within the framework of the reorganisation of political and legal powers resulting from 
globalisation, it is essential, for example, to guarantee access to justice as a universal 
right. Indeed, in Latin America we can find two constitutional watchdog institutions that 
exemplify construction of the necessary mechanisms, within the public sphere, to defend 
and guarantee fundamental goods such as the right to food. These two institutions are, the 
Public Defender’s Office which forms part of a public ministry of justice; and a separate 
public body with the power to call on the judiciary to intervene (the public ombudsman or 
defensorías públicas) (2014, 227-229). Something similar to these ombudsmen could be 
created in other states to oversee the way in which public authorities fulfil their obligations; 
but also how private bodies act to safeguard the basic rights that guarantee fundamental 
goods as a whole —common goods, non-transferable personal goods and social goods— 
and particularly the RAF.
Be that as it may, the protection of fundamental goods in the current constitutional 
state demands somewhat more than a reform of the existing institutions. It requires new 
social and political praxis that brings with it new relations between the individual and the 
political institutions in the community. To counter the current neoliberal hegemony and 
the limits and shortcomings that the current predominant legal culture presents, imbued 
as it is with the dogma of individualism and the strict separation of the political and 
economic spheres, we need to promote, as Barcellona expresses it, “instituent praxis” that 
transforms meanings and the institutions thus established (Barcellona 1996, 78-79). This 
praxis should lead to the formation of what I refer to elsewhere as a “fourth power” within 
the constitutional state.
This fourth branch of power would entail the creation of new public institutions 
whose realm of influence—through enacting checks and balances—is the powers of 
the state. The institutions would act with the aim of guaranteeing and protecting vital 
goods, allowing this project to advance while at the same time helping to consolidate 
the culture and practices that promote the democratic principle and the protection of 
fundamental goods. The fourth branch of power would be comprised of three types 
of institution: monitoring, judicial and deliberative. The institutions responsible for 
monitoring would oversee the use of public resources by public and private powers. 
Meanwhile, the judicial institutions would analyse and evaluate the degree of compliance 
with rights and fundamental goods on the part of those same powers. Finally, the 
deliberative institutions are those which give voice to civil society, enabling citizens 
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and associations to debate and put forward proposals concerning general interests or 
shared goods (Silveira 2017a; 2017b).
5. tHe puBlIc spHere artIculatIon wItH tHe powers of tHe role of tHe 
constItutIonal state: tHe need for a “fourtH power”
The limits of the current political sphere of liberal democracy could be transformed by 
constructing a new sphere of influence that operates between individuals, the organisations 
of civil society and the political institutions of representative democracy. The sphere of 
influence of the so-called participative democracy within the current model could become 
the instrument that allows us to move towards a more fully democratic society, with more 
citizen control and more political equality. Furthermore, public institutions that come 
under greater control from citizens and that count on the participation of independent 
social actors can also come to have a strong influence on private powers and interests, as 
can be seen through the experiences of public participation in Luton, Porto Alegre and 
Newcastle (Wainwright 2005, 195, 209). As opposed to the culture of the new neoliberal 
subject, we must offer a different culture that reinforces the idea of the democratic citizen 
who is committed to interests that are shared by all and, more specifically, to everything 
that is related to fundamental rights and goods, many of them already recognised in the 
corresponding legal systems.
This culture requires major efforts in education, training and empowerment of 
the members of the community. Today, the practice of the democratic principle and 
the maintenance of the principle of the rule of law demand that we achieve a cultural 
hegemony that inverts the current process of individualisation and the loss of ties between 
different members of the community. This issue of the “social ties and, therefore, of the 
determination of our shared goals,” Barcellona writes, “is not in the slightest something 
nostalgic, but rather a novel urgency” (1992, 125). Moreover, in order to achieve this 
new culture that promotes new social bonds, we require social and institutional spaces 
that allow us to implement and spread it. These new spaces and institutions will form the 
backbone of what I have here been referring to as the fourth power21.
Public opinion must find the means by which to reach the institutions that will 
allow it to intervene with efficacy and full legitimacy in the political system. The fourth 
branch of power is in no way intended to replace or leave to one side the existing 
mechanisms of representation and institutional participation; rather it is an attempt to 
construct a new institutional space governed by the law and which acts as a mediator 
between civil society and the institutions of the political system. It would act as the 
driving force for transformation of the public authorities already instituted, performing 
21 This proposal for the institutionalisation of a fourth branch of power at the heart of state governance 
in order to improve the relations between civil society and the political system shares many of the ideas 
and considerations of Habermas and Fraser on the role of the public sphere in deliberative democracy; of 
the “associative democracy” proposal of Cohen and Rogers (1998, 9); of the “state as the newest social 
movement” of Sousa Santos (1999); and of Mouffe with her idea to “radicalise the modern democratic 
tradition” (Mouffe 1999).
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functions of monitoring and follow-up of the organs of government and also drawing up 
new political proposals, in the search for better government and more democracy. It would 
thus accord with the philosophy that it is possible to “change the world without taking 
power,” as Wainwright proposes, following the path that Holloway previously opened up. 
The possibility of achieving social change and transformation depends on the correlation 
of the forces that at each given moment exist between the political powers and social 
power, within both political institutions and social organisations (Wainwright 2005, 197).
The objective of the institutions of the fourth power is to put into practice the two 
strands of the principle of participation in deliberative democracy: as the means through 
which to increase the capacity for self-decision and self-organisation of communities; 
and as a means to improve citizen control of the resources and institutions of the state 
(Wainwright 2005, 84). The institutions of the fourth power, therefore, form spaces of 
participation and communication channels through which the members of the community 
can participate in and influence both the public agenda and the institutions of government 
of the community (Politikon 2014, 263). They open the way for citizens to be able to 
participate in the general affairs of the community and to transmit their voice to the 
institutions of government, in addition to supervising the functioning of these latter bodies 
and safeguarding respect for and compliance with the rights, obligations and goods defined 
as basic and fundamental for the community. In this way, the fourth branch of power, 
representing the goals, aims and desires of the public sphere and civil society before the 
political system, and institutionalising checks and balances as well as communication 
channels with the public authorities, can become an instrument and driving force of the 
democratic principle in the community, and of the defence of fundamental rights and the 
common good.
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